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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 863 
FUTURE INTERESTS-POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
RETROACI'IVE LIMITATION-The township school trustees brought actions 
under the Reverter Act 1 to have the possibilities of reverter contained in 
the deeds to two currently unused school tracts declared invalid. In each 
case the trial court held that the possibility of reverter was alienable and 
that the Reverter Act was unconstitutional, being an ex post facto law and 
in violation of the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. 
On appeal, held, reversed. Since possibilities of reverter in Illinois are 
merely expectancies subject to change, modification, or abolition by legisla-
tive action, the act does not result in an unconstitutional taking of property. 
Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. (2d) 486, 130 N.E. 
(2d) 11 I (1955). 
Although legal writers have commented upon the difficulties in clearing 
titles caused by right of entry and possibility of reverter clauses2 and have 
advocated statutes to restrict the use of these clauses,3 there has been little 
legislation in this field.4 Judicial decisions limiting the effect of restrictive 
covenants when the restrictions are no longer of any economic value to 
those persons whom they are intended to benefit5 will presumably increase 
the resort to conveyances in fee simple determinable and fee subject to con-
dition subsequent by persons who have primarily non-economic reasons for 
restricting the use of property.6 When such an increase is compounded by 
the drastic penalty of forfeiture suffered by the landholder who fails to 
1 Section 4 of the act provides that no possibility of reverter or right of entry, 
whether created before or after passage of the act, shall be good for more than fifty years. 
Section 5 provides that if the limiting contingency has occurred in any possibilities of 
reverter created more than fifty years prior to passage of the act, an action for recovery 
of the land must be brought within one year of the act's passage. ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) 
c. 30, §§37e and 37f. 
2 Clark, "Limiting Land Restrictions," 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1931); Cook, "Rights of Entry, 
Possibilities of Reverter, Resulting Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,'' 15 TEMP. 
L.Q. 509 (1941). 
s Goldstein, "Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the 
Use of Land,'' 54 HARV. L. REv. 248 (1940); SCURLOCK, R.ETROACTIVE LEGISLATION A:FFEcr-
ING INTERESTS IN LAND 236 (1953). 
4 The Massachusetts, Michigan, and. Minnesota statutes are representative of the 
legislation presently in existence. All operate prospectively. Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 
184, §22; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46; Minn. Stat. (1953) §500.20. 
5 E.g.: Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 3 P. (2d) 545 (1931); Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 
147 s. 862 (1933). 
6 These include provisions that land be used for church purposes, First Universalist 
Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892), that liquor not be sold on the prop• 
erty, Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 (1879), and, of course, the normal building and 
use restrictions ordinarily provided for by covenants. 
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comply with the conditions and limitations7 it will inevitably cause more 
state legislatures to place limitations on the use of these clauses. Although 
the Illinois statute is not unique in its retroactive provisiQns, the principal 
case is the first to uphold the constitutionality of such a statute.s In finding 
that there was no taking of property, the court was aided by a series of 
Illinois decisions which clearly spelled out the status of these future in-
terests. These cases decided that a possibility of reverter is incapable of 
alienation, devise or partition9 and "until the limiting contingency occurs 
it is ... no more than an expectation ... subject to change, modification 
or abolition by legislative action."10 With this background, the court in 
the principal case was clearly justified in holding that the possibility of 
reverter is not a property right, and, consequently, that there was no un-
constitutional taking of property under the statute. This background in-
dicates, however, that other state courts might not find the retroactive pro-
visions of such an act constitutional. The modern trend is to the effect 
that powers of reverter are alienable.11 It is difficult to see how an interest 
which may be sold, given or devised can be held not to be "property." 
An additional constitutional problem, suggested by but not discussed 
in the principal case, is the validity of the statutory classification. The 
court made no finding as to_ whether the limiting contingency in the deed 
had actually occurred prior to passage of the act. It declared that if it had 
not occurred, the fifty year limitation abolished the right of action; if it 
had occurred, the provision that an action must be brought within one 
year from passage of the act abolished it. The construction of the latter 
provision as being merely a statute of limitations which was within the 
legislature's power to change at will seems to be based on a fallacious as-
sumption as to the status of the parties after the occurrence of the con-
tingency provided for in a possibility of reverter. Upon the happening of 
the contingency the holder of the possibility of reverter immediately be-
comes the owner in fee simple and the prior owner, at best, an adverse pos-
7 There are only a few cases where American courts have applied equitable principles 
to rights of entry and possibilities of reverter and did not allow forfeiture where there 
was no longer any economic benefit in the restriction. See 53 MICH. L. REv. 246 (1954). 
s A Florida statute passed in 1951 applied a twenty-one year limitation to rights of 
entry and possibilities of reverter, but this statute, unlike the Illinois act, exempted 
conveyances to charitable organizations. Fla. Stat. (1955) §689.18. Because of the retro-
active provisions, the Florida Supreme Court declared the whole act unconstitutional. 
Biltmore Village v. Royal, (Fla. 1954) 71 S. (2d) 727. This decision is criticized in Ham-
mond, "Limitations Upon Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry," CURRENT TRENI>s 
IN STATE LEGISLATION 589 at 629 (1954) (Univ. of Mich. Law School, Legislative Research 
Center). 
9 Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church of Pleasant Grove v. Parker, 373 Ill. 607, 27 
N.E. (2d) 522 (1940); Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 60, 112 N.E. 286 (1916). The Reverter Act 
expressly reiterates the fact that these interests are inalienable and not devisable. Ill. Rev. 
Stat. (1955) c. 30, §37b. 
10 Principal case at 491, citing People ex rel. Franchere v. Chicago, 321 Ill. 466, 152 
N.E. 141 (1926); Prall v. Burckhart, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921). 
11 See 4 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESrS, 2d ed., §1860 (1956). 
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sessor. It is arguable that since the holder of the possibility of reverter 
upon the happening of the contingency is a non-possessory owner in fee 
simple with the same rights of any other non-possessory owner, any legisla-
tion forcing him to act against an adverse possessor sooner than other 
owners discriminates against him solely because of the manner in which 
he acquired his fee simple title.12 
Paul A. Heinen, S.Ed. 
12 If a court determined, as the lliinois court did, that possibilities of reverter could 
be modified by the legislature at will, this would not be a valid objection where the lim-
iting contingency occurred after passage of the act but it would seem to present an argu-
ment for the holder of a fee which reverted prior to the act's passage. However, it must 
be remembered that the courts have been very liberal in upholding allegedly discrimina-
tory statutes where there is a valid economic basis for distinguishing between different 
classes. See RoTISCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 551 (1939). 
